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Abstract
Application-level access control enforcement of complex policies
is suffering from bad performance. This is especially true for search
operations when the query results must be filtered by the appli-
cation according to constraints of access control policies. One ap-
proach to reduce this overhead is to incorporate the access control
policy in search queries on such data through query rewriting. This
poses challenges to what can be expressed as part of such queries
when complex policies must be taken into account, especially for
expressive policy languages such as XACML. This paper proposes
a transformation that converts attribute-based XACML policies to
database queries while maintaining original policy semantics. This
includes coping with XACML properties such as policy trees and
many-valued logic. Our analysis verifies that the transformation
leads to equivalent evaluation decisions and that it is a promising
step towards policy-based database security.
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1 Introduction
Data security is an issue that is increasingly important, among others due to
the growing popularity of big data systems. Growing amounts of data that are
stored, retrieved and analyzed by such systems call for comprehensive security
measures that can scale with the size of the data set on which they are enforced,
especially for operations such as search.
In particular, access control is one such security measure for which the en-
forcement must scale with regard to the size of the data set. Access control re-
stricts subjects (e.g., users) from performing actions on objects (i.e., resources)
in a certain context. Access control constraints are specified in a policy, and
enforcing expressive constraints can be problematic for search operations.
For example, consider an electronic document processing platform that gen-
erates, manages, and distributes business documents (e.g., invoices), and also is
one of the three case studies that drove this research [2]. This application sup-
ports searching documents. However, when subjects do so, only documents to
which they are entitled according to the access control policy should be returned.
One approach to cope with this is to describe access constraints as part of a
database query by means of views [1, 17]. However, such an approach complicates
the interface with the database [6] and involves the database administrators in
the specification process, violating the separation of concerns principle [8].
To mitigate such issues, we propose the use of an externalized policy to
determine the access constraints against the result of a search operation. One
important technology that enables this is XACML [14]. XACML supports the ex-
pression of complex constraints that involve attributes associated with subjects,
resources, actions and the environment (e.g., the current time). For example,
it enables expressions such as “subjects of the sales department can search doc-
uments shared with customers assigned to them”. A naive approach to enable
externalized policy enforcement for search with such constraints is to serially
evaluate the access control policy against each element of the result set of the
search operation, as illustrated in Figure 1. This approach does not scale with
regard to size of the data set, because it involves evaluating complex expressions
and fetching of attribute values for each item that results from the search, which
typically leads to considerable overhead [7, 19].
Fig. 1. A naive approach evaluates the
policy for each item in the result set
Fig. 2. Query rewriting combines search
parameters with the transformed policy
Instead, we propose a query rewriting approach that combines the policy and
search parameters into a compound query, as illustrated in Figure 2. First, we
substitute all attributes corresponding to the subject, action and environment
in the policy, because they remain fixed for the operation. Next, we transform
the policy into a query and compose it with the search parameters.
Query rewriting can reduce scaling issues involved with serial evaluation,
while maintaining the separation of concerns of a policy-based approach. How-
ever, in order to do this, a transformation of the policy must be performed. The
result is a query expression that must be equivalent to the access control policy.
In other words, every request that is denied for a certain subject, resource, action
and environment for the policy evaluation must also not be returned as part of
the result set of the query. This requires overcoming fundamental issues in how
expressive policies such as XACML can be transformed to query constraints.
This paper introduces an approach capable of performing this transformation
for a subset of XACML that is optimized for queries. Also, it verifies equivalence
with policy evaluation and evaluates the complexity of the resulting expressions
with regard to the original policy. This provides a first step towards a query
rewriting middleware that enables scalable access control for search operations.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes related work. Section 3
introduces the models of both the XACML language and query that we use as
a basis for the transformation. Section 4 elaborates on the transformation ap-
proach. It also presents proof that this leads to equivalent access control enforce-
ment. Section 5 analyzes the size complexity of the resulting query expression
with regard to the original policy. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
A lot of prior research has focused on database security [6]. In general, four
approaches are related to the optimization of access control for search operations.
First, Fine-Grained Access Control (FGAC) techniques provide row-level se-
curity for databases by means of query rewriting techniques [1, 9, 17]. Typically,
this involves extending the queries by means of policies that are specified in
query language and may be described as part of views. However, because ac-
cess constraints are described in a query language, they violate the principle of
separation of concerns [8] because the database administrator must be involved
in policy specification. Moreover, these technologies generally assume a two-tier
architecture in which a subject directly queries the database. Contemporary ap-
plications are commonly designed in a multi-tier architecture. As a result, the
applications perform queries on behalf of a subject, but are identified and se-
cured as the users of the database [18]. This supports only coarse-grained policies
that reason about application permissions1. Our approach, on the other hand,
does enable fine-grained access control for multi-tier architectures.
Second, approaches exist that configure the access control system of the
database based on an external policy. Notably, MyABDAC [11] compiles a
XACML policy into an access control list. Mutti et al. [13] take a similar ap-
proach to extend SQLite for SELinux support. However, these approaches can
have issues with large data sets and may require a modification of the DBMS.
Third, serial policy evaluation can be performed for each of the results of a
database operation. Bouncer [15] is a system that takes this approach for the
CPOL trust management system. However, this can lead to significant overhead
when the size of the result set increases.
In this paper, we take a query rewriting approach that expresses the external
access control policy as part of the search query. This retains separation of
concerns, remains scalable with regard the data set size and does not require
DBMS modification. Axiomatics Data Access Filter [5] supports a technology
that applies query rewriting to an externalized XACML policy. However, they
do not provide verification of equivalence of the original XACML policy and the
query. Besides a transformation approach, this paper also verifies equivalence.
1 Oracle’s Virtual Private Database (VPD, [1]) supports queries that identify both
application and subject, but still requires in-database policy specification.
Recently, Turkmen et al. [20] proposed a similar approach to ours to trans-
form XACML policies in terms of boolean expressions for policy analysis. They
defined a range of disjoint decision spaces in which access requests are di-
vided (i.e., for permit, deny, indeterminate and not applicable requests). How-
ever, their approach cannot be used for this work because they define the not
applicable decision space in terms of request membership of other decision spaces.
In our approach, not applicable requests by default lead to a deny decision and
non-inclusion of the relevant element in the result set. This ultimately leads
to smaller query expressions because we only focus on recognizing permissive
requests. Moreover, [20] does not verify equivalence with the original policy.
3 A model for XACML and database queries
This section describes a policy model that largely reflects the characteristics of
the XACML language. It also introduces a model for database queries. These
models are used throughout the remainder of the paper.
We do not consider special characteristics of XACML such as obligations and
the extended indeterminate set, as we did not encounter a need for them in the
context of search operations in our case studies. However, they constitute an
interesting topic for future work.
3.1 XACML
In order to accomodate a transformation, we focus on XACML [14] as the policy
language of the original policy. XACML provides an interesting language model
that has been an inspiration to several other access control policy languages
such as ALFA [4] and STAPL [12]. Also, XACML supports the specification in
popular access control models such as RBAC [16] and ABAC [10]. The language
model of XACML supports several features such as policy trees, many-valued
logic and logical expressions that asses attribute comparisons.
Informally, XACML provides a tree-structured, attribute-based policy lan-
guage in which policy components can themselves contain other policy compo-
nents, thus forming a policy tree with rules as leaf elements2. We refer to them
both as policy elements. Applicability of policy elements is determined during
the evaluation, in which a target expression indicates applicability for a policy
component, and a condition expression indicates applicability for a rule. We do
not regard targets of rules, as they can be combined in a conjunction with the
condition expression for the same evaluation result. If a rule is applicable, its
corresponding decision (i.e., permit or deny) is taken into account. Expressions
compare attributes assigned to subjects, resources, actions and environment with
each other and concrete values in order to determine the applicability. Combining
algorithms provide conflict resolution when multiple policy elements are appli-
cable (e.g., first applicable, permit overrides).
2 We do not regard policy sets as a separate entity type for this model and instead
refer to them as policy components as well.
We define an expression as follows:
Definition 1. An expression e ∈ Expr is of the form
e := a1 B val | a1 B a2 | e1 ∧ e2 | e1 ∨ e2 | ¬e1 | ∅
In which a1, a2 ∈ Attr indicate attributes that need to be substituted with con-
crete values when the expression is evaluated, val ∈ V a concrete value part
of the set of all possible concrete values and e1, e2 ∈ Expr other expressions.
Operator B indicates how values can be compared (e.g., <,≤,=).
Policy elements are specified more formally as follows:
Definition 2. A policy element p can be of two forms:
– A tuple (t, pc, comb) indicates a policy component with target expression
t ∈ Expr part of the set of all valid expressions, a totally ordered, non-empty
set of child elements pc and combining algorithm comb.
– A tuple (cond, eff ) indicates a rule element with a condition expression
cond ∈ Expr and an effect eff ∈ {permit, deny}.
We define permit(p) and deny(p) as the sets of all rules that have a per-
mit and deny effect, respectively, for a policy component p. Also, children(p)
reflects the totally ordered set of all rules of the policy component p. Boolean
function rule(p) indicates if a policy element p is a rule. Functions cond(r)
and target(p) extract the condition and target expressions of a rule and pol-
icy component, respectively. Similarly, eff(r) indicates the effect of a rule and
comb(p) the combining algorithm of a policy. Finally, we denote P the set of
all valid policy elements. Obligations and the extended indeterminate set of
XACML 3.0 (containing decisions that indicate what should have been returned
if no error had occurred, such as Indeterminate{P}) are not considered in this
model because we did not encounter a need for them in our case studies.
To illustrate this, Figure 3 considers a schematic example of a policy for
an electronic document processing platform. Rules r1, r2, r3 and r4 have con-
ditions of the form “resource.creator == subject.id” an ownership rule, or
“resource.type == ‘catalog’”. Subject attributes are substituted prior to the
transformation because a single subject performs the search. Policy components
p1 and p2 have an empty target that is always applicable, denoted by ∅.
In order to evaluate a policy, the applicable child elements must be evaluated
and their evaluation outcomes combined using a combining algorithm. Applica-
bility is determined by evaluating target and condition expressions. For this, we
define function evalExpr.
Definition 3. An expression evaluation evalExpr: Expr × α → {true, false}
is a function that takes as input a mapping α : Attr → V that projects all
attributes ai ∈ Attr of the expression onto concrete values val ∈ V and evaluates
whether the expression is true when the concrete values are taken into account.
Fig. 3. The policy includes policy components p1, p2 and p3 with a first applicable (FA)
and deny overrides (DO) combining algorithms and rules (r1, r2 r3 and r4). Unlike p1
and p2, p3 is not applicable for guests. We did not include any actions for brevity.
For example, rule r3 in Figure 3 is applicable when the evaluated resource in
the evaluation context α is a catalog. Otherwise, evalExpr evaluates to false.
For expressions, an evaluation context α : Attr → V enables substitution
of subject, action and environment attributes to values. We assume that every
context α is always complete, i.e., that every attribute is mapped to a value.
Alternatively, evalExpr can also lead to an Indeterminate decision, e.g.,
whenever an attribute could not be retrieved. We propagate this decision to the
result of the policy element evaluation by evalPolicy.
Definition 4. Function evalPolicy: P × α → {Permit, Deny, NotAppli-
cable, Indeterminate} takes as input a context α : Attr → V and evaluates
all policy elements to come to a decision d ∈ {Permit,Deny, NotApplicable,
Indeterminate}. The decision process for a function evalPolicy(p, α) with eval-
uation context α and p ∈ P is determined based on four aspects:
1. Indeterminate decisions are returned when problems occur that impede eval-
uation (e.g., network problems, invalid policy or attribute retrieval issues).
2. If p is a rule, then evalPolicy(p, α) = eff (p) if its condition is satisfied. If
the condition is not satisfied, then it evaluates to not applicable (NA).
3. If p is a policy component, and each child element evaluates to NA, then p
evaluates to NA. It also evaluates to NA if its target evaluates to false.
4. Otherwise, if p is a policy, the result of evalPolicy(p, α) is determined by
the combining algorithm comb(p).
We consider the transformation for three common combining algorithms: first
applicable (FA), permit overrides (PO) and deny overrides (DO). Supplementary
to the aspects above, they influence the decision as follows:
First Applicable. This algorithm considers the first policy element that is
applicable and returns the result of its evaluation. Formally, for p1, p2, ..., pn ∈
children(p) the child elements of a policy p in which p1 < p2 < ... < pn, the
decision of a policy component p under context α with comb(p) = FA is defined
as evalPolicy(p, α) = e ⇔ [∃pi ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(pi, α) = e ∧ (∀pj ∈
children(p) : evalPolicy(pj , α) 6= NA⇒ pj > pi)], with e ∈ {Permit,Deny}.
Deny Overrides. In this algorithm, any child element that evaluates to a
deny decision overrides any other decisions. More formally, evalPolicy(p, α) =
Deny ⇔ ∃c ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(c, α) = Deny. Such a policy evaluates
to a permit decision if a child element evaluates to this and no deny decision
is encountered, described as evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit ⇔ ∃c ∈ children(p) :
evalPolicy(c, α) = Permit ∧ ¬∃c ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(c, α) = Deny.
Permit Overrides. In this algorithm child elements that evaluate to per-
mit override other decisions: evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit ⇔ ∃c ∈ children(p) :
evalPolicy(c, α) = Permit and evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny ⇔ ∃c ∈ children(p) :
evalPolicy(c, α) = Deny ∧ ¬∃ c ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(c, α) = Permit.
3.2 Database queries
Contrary to XACML policies, database queries consist of expressions that com-
pare table cells with concrete values or each other to determine whether an
element in a row should be selected. This paper considers queries of the form
SELECT * FROM table WHERE expr in which expr specifies constraints to filter
out the table contents by. The query returns all rows that satisfy expr.
Database expressions are similar to policy expressions. Consider T the set of
all tables in a database schema. Function columns(t) denotes the set of columns
that exists for any table t ∈ T . In this paper, we disregard schemaless databases.
Definition 5. A database expression is a tuple (t, e) in which t ∈ T describes
the table of the elements, and e is a query expression of the form e := t.c1 .val |
t.c1 . t.c2 | e1 ∧ e2 | e1 ∨ e2 | ¬e1, with e1, e2 other query expressions,
t.ci indicating the column ci of a table t, val a concrete value and comparison
operator . (e.g., <,≤,=).
We treat each table row as separate resource described by the contents in its
corresponding columns. Columns are considered the attributes of the resource.
Note that some resource attributes could be part of another table t2 ∈ T ,
and would require joins to address them. For brevity, we do not consider this
here but this does not limit expressiveness of the policy in terms of the query.
4 Transformation
This section elaborates on the transformation approach. The approach gradually
transforms the policy to a flat policy, i.e., a single policy component with only
rules as children. Next, it converts the conditions of its permit rules into a
query expression that is composed with search parameters. First, we introduce
the concept of a well-defined policy, which is a necessary prerequisite for the
transformation. Next, we detail the approach further. We also verify correctness
for the policy flattening.
The transformation approach requires a well-defined policy because there
always needs to be a default decision over whether a request is permitted or not.
Definition 6. A well-defined policy p is a policy for which each evaluation re-
sults in a permit or deny decision. More formally: p is well-defined ⇔ ∀α :
evalPolicy(p, α) ∈ {Permit,Deny}.
To support this, we assume that an evaluation error that would otherwise re-
sult in an indeterminate decision is handled by the underlying application plat-
form. This includes, among others, issues with missing attributes which due to
the transformation might lead to a query execution error. This does not support
the use of extended indeterminate decisions that are specified in XACML 3.0 [14]
which can lead to an evaluation decision (i.e., permit or deny) depending on the
source of the indeterminate decision, which constitutes an interesting topic for
future work. In the case studies that drove this research, we did not encounter a
need for this and instead, any errors should lead to search query being aborted.
If this is taken into account, any policy can be extended to a well-defined
policy given a default decision to override NA decisions. For this work, we deny
such requests. This is done by constructing a parent policy pFA with an empty
target, an FA algorithm, and two children policy elements. The first child is the
original policy component, and the second element always evaluates to Deny.
To transform a well-defined policy p to a flat policy, we iterate over two steps.
1. Every policy component with only rules as children is converted to a policy
component with PO algorithm. The combination of its rules must reflect the
same evaluation result as the original policy.
2. This step regards policy components that combine other PO policy compo-
nents with rules as children, i.e., the grandparent policies to the rules of PO
policy components. It converts each of them to a policy component with PO
algorithm and only rules as children. This enables flattening the policy.
We iterate over these steps until we have a flat policy component with PO
algorithm that contains only rules as children. The transformation maintains
equivalence over evalPolicy, meaning that for every evaluation context α, the
evaluation result for both original and flat policy should be the same. Hence, the
permit rules of the flat policy will reflect the only cases in which the evaluation
can evaluate to permit, and thus for which any item of the result set of a search
should be returned. Consequently, the conditions of all permit rules are com-
bined into the query expression with the original search parameters. Note that
this differs from the goal of [3], which determines the attribute sets for decisive
evaluation, and from [20] which constructs decision spaces for policy analysis.
An example of the two flattening steps is illustrated in Figure 4. The figure
shows an example transformation of a policy tree into a flat policy that contains
only rules as children. The permit rules of the flat policy are then combined into
a query expression.
The remainder of this section elaborates on the flattening steps and demon-
strates equivalence with regard to evaluation on the original policy. Next, it
elaborates on the transformation of the flat policy to a database query.
Fig. 4. Example of a policy tree that is gradually transformed into a flat policy as
a first part of the transformation. The results of the first step are illustrated in red
(squared), results of the second step in green (circled).
4.1 Step 1: Converting to PO policies
In the first step, each policy component of a policy that has only rules as children
is converted to a policy component with PO algorithm. This is also shown in
Figure 5.
Fig. 5. The first transformation step converts every policy component with only rules
as children to a policy component with PO algorithm.
We distinguish between policy components with a DO and FA algorithm to
describe the conversion. We specify a transformation function Θ : P → P that
converts a policy component to one with PO algorithm. Since policy components
with PO algorithm already satisfy this goal, we do not consider them here.
Deny overrides. To convert a policy component p with comb(p) = DO to a PO
policy component, consider that every deny rule rdi ∈ deny(p) is decisive, i.e.,
it overrides other decisions if both rdi and p are applicable under a evaluation
context α. We specify the transformation function ΘDO as follows:
ΘDO(p) := p
′ with

children(p′) = {ΦDO(r, p) | r ∈ children(p)}
target(p′) = target(p)
comb(p′) = PO
In which ΦDO is a helper function to transform the rules that ensures permit
rules can only be applicable if no deny rule is applicable. It does this by con-
catenating negations of conditions of the deny rules for each permit rule, more
formally:
ΦDO(ri, p) := r
′
i with

cond(r′i) =
cond(ri) ∧ (
∧
rj∈deny(p)
¬cond(rj)), if ri ∈ permit(p)
cond(ri), if ri ∈ deny(p)
eff (r′i) = eff (ri)
For example, policy p3 of Figure 3 would generate a novel permit rule r
′
3 with
condition “resource.org != ‘eDocs’ and resource.type = ‘catalog’ ”. The original
deny rule r4 would also be included in transformed policy ΘDO(p3). Note that
p1 is not transformed in this step as it has policy components as children.
Under this transformation, it suffices to demonstrate that for each eval-
uation context α, evalPolicy(p, α) = d ⇒ evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = d with
d ∈ {Permit,Deny,NA}. We refer to this property as equivalence. In this step,
this property holds when ¬rule(p) and ∀c ∈ children(p) : rule(c).
Proof. In order to prove equivalence, we distinguish between three cases. First,
we show that for all α, evalPolicy(p, α) = NA ⇒ evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) =
NA. Second, evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit ⇒ evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = Permit.
Third, evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny ⇒ evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = Deny. Since we
argue this for all α, equivalence is proven. In the first case, if evalPolicy(p, α) =
NA then either evalExpr(target(p), α) = false, or else ¬∃r ∈ children(p) :
evalExpr(cond(r), α) = true. The original target is retained under the transfor-
mation, so an inapplicable target remains so. When there is no applicable rule
in the original policy, then this will also hold under the transformation because
for permit rules the condition depends on the original conditions of permit rules
which can never be true. For deny rules, the original condition is retained. As
a result, evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = NA. The second case holds because none of
the deny rules rd ∈ deny(p) are applicable. If they were, then the evaluation
would lead to a deny decision. Since evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = false for all rd,
the second clause of permit rules in ΦDO are true under α since it is a con-
junction of negated deny rule conditions. Because evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit,
∃rp ∈ permit(p) : evalExpr(cond(rp), α) = true. As a result, at least ΦDO(rp)
must be applicable, and evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = Permit. The third case holds
because there must be at least one rule rd ∈ deny(p) which is applicable. As a
consequence, none of the permit rules from the transformation can be applica-
ble because of the second clause of ΦDO. Moreover, the original deny rules are
included in ΦDO and therefore evalPolicy(ΘDO(p), α) = Deny. 
Consequently, we can transform any policy component with only rules as
children and a DO algorithm to an equivalent policy with PO algorithm.
First applicable. Given a policy component p with comb(p) = FA that
must be converted to a PO policy component. Let r1, r2, ..., rn ∈ children(p)
be an ordered list of rules with r1 < r2 < ... < rn. For a FA evaluation, a
rule ri ∈ children(p) is decisive under α if evalExpr(cond(ri), α) = true and
¬∃rj ∈ children(p) : rj < ri ∧ evalExpr(cond(rj), α) = true. The transforma-
tion incorporates the decisiveness of deny rules into permit rules by means of a
transformation function ΦFA. We specify this function as
ΦFA(ri, p) := r
′
i with

cond(r′i) =
cond(ri) ∧ (
∧
rj∈deny(p):rj<ri
¬cond(rj)), if ri ∈ permit(p)
cond(ri), if ri ∈ deny(p)
eff (r′i) = eff (ri)
Function ΦFA maintains the original deny rules while it includes the negation
of conditions of prior deny rules in permit rules. We define ΘFA as follows:
ΘFA(p) := p’ with

children(p′) = {ΦFA(r, p) | r ∈ children(p)}
target(p′) = target(p)
comb(p′) = PO
For example, the transformation of policy p2 from Figure 3 includes deny rule
r1, and permit rule ΦFA(r2) = r
′
2 has condition “resource.org != ’LargeBank’
and resource.creator == 43” if the subject that performed the request is not a
guest, has identifier 43 and is affiliated with organization LargeBank.
Under this transformation, equivalence between p and ΘFA(p) holds.
Proof. We again consider the three cases as in the previous proof. For the first
case, we argue that ΦFA again includes all of the original conditions, so not
applicable rules remain so. Also, the original target is included. As a result,
equivalence holds for the NA decision. For the second case, if evalPolicy(p, α) =
Permit, ∃ri ∈ permit(p) : evalExpr(cond(ri), α) = true∧ (¬∃rj ∈ children(p) :
evalExpr(cond(rj), α) = true ∧ rj < ri). Because comb(ΘFA(p)) = PO it
suffices to prove equivalence under permit rules of the transformation. From the
definition of ΦFA follows that permit rules include conjunctions of negations of
deny rule conditions. For every rj < ri, evalExpr(cond(rj), α) = false because
they are not applicable. As a result, the condition of at least one permit rule
rp ∈ permit(p) remains applicable, because every deny rule before it does not
have an applicable condition, and the condition of every rj < rp is negated and
conjuncted to the condition of rp. If evalExpr(cond(ΦFA(rp)), α) would not be
true, this would contradict the premise that rp is the first applicable rule of p.
The third case is similar to the second one. Since evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny, there
exists a rule rd ∈ deny(p) for which evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = true and for which
∀ r ∈ children(p) : r < rd ⇒ evalExpr(cond(r), α) = false. Consequently, for
each permit rule r′p ∈ permit(ΘFA(p)), there is a permit rule rp ∈ permit(p) for
which either (a) rp < rd, or (b) rp > rd. In case of (a), evalExpr(cond(rp), α) =
false because this would otherwise violate the requirement for rd to be decisive.
In case of (b), the transformation r′p cannot be applicable as it includes a negation
of the condition of rd as part of its clause, which cannot be satisfied. As a result,
evalPolicy(ΘFA(p), α) = Deny. 
4.2 Step 2: Combining policy components
The second step of the transformation flattens each policy component that has as
children other policy components with only rules and a PO algorithm. More for-
mally, this requires for a policy component p that ∀p′ ∈ children(p) : rule(p′) =
false ∧ comb(p′) = PO ∧ (∀r ∈ children(p′) : rule(r) = true). The trans-
formation incorporates the rules of the children into a novel, flattened policy
component that has a PO combining algorithm. This is also shown in Figure 6.
Fig. 6. The second transformation step combines rules of child policies into a novel,
flattened PO policy component. We support this for PO, DO and FA algorithms.
A rule is applicable only if both its condition as well as the target of its
parent policy component are true. Therefore, we first compose the target of each
child policy component with the condition of its rules. Next, we perform a trans-
formation for which we again distinguish between the combining algorithm of
the parent policy component. We will only consider DO and FA transformations
here, as the PO transformation includes the original rules of the assimilated
policy component.
Deny overrides. To transform a policy component p with comb(p) = DO
and child policies pc1 , pc2 , ..., pcn ∈ children(p) to a policy component with only
rules as children and PO algorithm, we define function ∆DO. This function uses
helper function ΨDO which generates a single permit rule. This rule must never
be applicable if one of the child policies leads to a deny decision. To ensure this,
for every child policy component pci ∈ children(p) we must thus make sure that
ϕ(pci) := [(
∨
rp∈permit(pci )
cond(rp)) ∨ (
∧
rd∈deny(pci )
¬cond(rd))] holds. In other words, either a
permit rule is applicable or no deny rule is applicable.
If we assume permits(p) the set of all permit rules of all child policy com-
ponents of p, we can specify helper function ΨDO as
ΨDO(p) := r
′ with
cond(r
′) = (
∨
rp∈permits(p)
cond(rp) ∧
∧
pc∈children(p)
ϕ(pc)
eff (r′) = permit
The rule of ΨDO is only applicable if at least one child element evaluates
to permit (first clause), and no other child elements evaluate to deny (second
clause). Assuming denies(p) the set of all deny rules of all child policy compo-
nents of p, we can now define transformation function ∆DO as:
∆DO(p) := p
′ with

children(p′) = {ΨDO(p)} ∪ {r | r ∈ denies(p)}
target(p′) = target(p)
comb(p′) = PO
This transformation function leaves the evaluation of the transformed policy
equivalent to the original policy.
For example, the transformation of policy p1 from Figure 3 includes the
original deny rules, and constructs a rule r′2,3 with condition “[(resource.creator
== 43 and resource.org != ‘LargeBank’) or (resource.type == ‘catalog’ and re-
source.org != ‘eDocs’)] and [(resource.creator == 43 and resource.org != ‘Large-
Bank’) or resource.org != ‘LargeBank’] and [(resource.type == ‘catalog’ and
resource.org != ‘eDocs’) or resource.org != ‘eDocs’]”. This can be normalized
to “(resource.creator == 43 or resource.type == ‘catalog’) and resource.org !=
‘LargeBank’ and resource.org != ‘eDocs’ ”.
Proof. We prove equivalence by demonstrating the evaluation of the permit rule
constructed by ΨDO(p). Function ΨDO offers several observations:
1. If any of the child policies evaluates to permit under α, then the first clause
of ΨDO(p) will evaluate to true, since this is a disjunction of conditions of
the original permit rules of which at least one must be applicable.
2. If all child policies evaluate to permit under α then the second clause of ΨDO
evaluates to true, since this would mean that at least one rule rp ∈ permit(pc)
is applicable for each child policy pc and the second clause includes a dis-
junction of these conditions for each child policy.
3. If all child policies are not applicable for α, then the second clause of ΨDO
evaluates to true, since ∀rd ∈ children(pc) : evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = false
for all pc ∈ children(p) and by negation this satisfies the second clause.
4. If there exists a child policy component pD ∈ children(p) that evaluates
to deny, then the second clause of ΨDO is false, since ∃rd ∈ deny(pD) :
evalExpr(¬cond(rd), α) = false for that policy pD and none of the condi-
tions of the permit rules evaluate to true.
To prove equivalence, we again consider the three possible outcomes.
First, if evalPolicy(p, α) = NA, then observation (3) argues that the second
clause of ΨDO is true. However, the first clause of ΨDO, which is in conjunction
with the satisfied clause, is false because no permit rule is applicable under α.
Second, if evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit, there are two possible cases. Either (a)
all of the child policies evaluate to permit, or (b) at least one of the child policies
evaluates to permit and the other policies are not applicable. In case of (a), we
conclude from observations (1) and (2) that equivalence holds under any α. In
case of (b), it suffices to show from observations (2) and (3) that the second
clause is true, as observation (1) ensures that the first clause is always true.
Since for each child policy ∀rd ∈ children(pc) : evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = false
if it evaluates to not applicable, and ∃rp ∈ permit(pc) : evalExpr(cond(rp), α) =
true if it evaluates to permit. Hence, if a policy component pc evaluates to permit
or not applicable, ΨDO(p) evaluates to permit for the evaluation context α.
Third, if evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny, there exists at least one child policy
pD ∈ children(p) for which evalPolicy(pD, α) = Deny. Hence, observation (4)
holds and ΨDO(p) is not applicable. Since the original deny rules are included in
∆DO, at least one deny rule is applicable and ∆DO evaluates to deny.
As a result, equivalence holds for every evaluation under any context α. 
First applicable. For the transformation of a policy component p with child
policies pc1 , pc2 , ..., pcn ∈ children(p), comb(pci) = PO and comb(p) = FA to
a policy component with only rules as children and PO algorithm, we define
function ∆FA. We note pci < pci+1 for i > 0 and i < n if a policy component
pci precedes pci+1 for the evaluation. We first specify helper function ΨFA to
define ∆FA. For this, we denote pre(r) := {ri ∈ deny(pci) | pci < pc with r ∈
children(pc)}.
ΨFA(r) := r
′with

cond(r′) =
cond(r) ∧
∧
rd∈pre(r)
¬cond(rd), if eff (r) = permit
cond(r), if eff (r) = deny
eff (r′) = eff (r)
This helper function takes into account any deny rules that might be deci-
sive prior to permit rules of latter policies. It enables us to define function ∆FA as
∆FA(p) := p
′with

children(p′) = {ΨFA(r, pc, p) | r ∈ children(pc), pc ∈ children(p)}
target(p′) = target(p)
comb(p′) = PO
The evaluation of ∆FA(p) is equivalent to that of original policy p.
Proof. We again consider the three outcomes for evalPolicy(p, α).
If evalPolicy(p, α) = NA, then ∀r ∈ children(pc) : evalExpr(cond(r), α) =
false with pc ∈ children(p). Consequently, rules constructed by ΨFA are not
applicable and evalPolicy(∆FA(p), α) = NA.
If evalPolicy(p, α) = Permit, then ∃pP ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(pP , α) =
Permit ∧ (∀pc ∈ children(p) : pc < pP ⇒ evalPolicy(pc, α) = NA). Thus,
∃rp ∈ permit(pP ) : evalExpr(cond(rp), α) = true the first applicable rule of pP
and ∀pc < pP : ¬∃rd ∈ deny(pc) : evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = true. Hence, ΨFA
builds at least one applicable permit rule, so evalPolicy(∆FA(p), α) = Permit.
If evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny, then ∃pD ∈ children(p) : evalPolicy(pD, α) =
Deny and also ∃rd ∈ deny(pD) : evalExpr(cond(rd), α) = true a first applicable
rule of pD and ¬∃pc ∈ children(p) : pc < pD∧evalPolicy(pc, α) 6= NA. It suffices
to demonstrate that ΨFA (a) generates at least one applicable deny rule, and
(b) does not generate any applicable permit rule. Proposition (a) follows from
the deny rules, which are included verbatim with ΨFA for all child policies. For
(b), suppose r′p ∈ permit(∆FA(p)) a permit rule generated with ΨFA. Since an
applicable rd ∈ deny(pD) also exists, for r′p to be applicable, it must be true that
it was generated from a condition of rp ∈ permit(pP ) with pP ∈ children(p) for
which pP < pD. Otherwise, the second clause of ΨFA for permit rules would never
be true. However, this would violate the premise that evalPolicy(p, α) = Deny.
As a result, evalPolicy(∆FA(p), α) = Deny. 
4.3 Transforming a flat policy to a database query
We iterate over the previous two steps of the transformation until we obtain a
single policy component p for which ∀ el ∈ children(p) : rule(el) = true. This
is a flat policy. The last part of the transformation converts the child rules of
the flat policy p to a database query clause. In order to do this, each of the
permit rules rp ∈ permit(p) is transformed by function ω. This is done for a
table t which is the same table on which the search query is performed, and
hence reflects the resources to be protected.
ω(p, t) := q with
expression(q) =
∨
r∈permit(p)
τ(cond(r))
table(q) = t
With t ∈ T the database schema and a function τ that maps the referred
attributes to the database columns of t. Such a mapping should be specified by
the security administrator together with the policy.
The resulting query will only select the rows that satisfy the given policy p.
The equivalence of this policy was demonstrated in the previous section. Because
we convert a PO policy to a query expression, satisfying any of the clauses will
suffice to include a row. Since p is decisive, it always evaluates to either a permit
or a deny decision. This translates to a true evaluation of the elements of the
query that would also lead to a permit decision for p, and false for elements that
do not. Consequently, rows that do not satisfy the condition would be rejected
by the policy evaluation and are also not returned by the query.
As indicated in Section 4.2, the transformation of the policy from Figure 3
results in a flat policy with three rules. This includes the two original deny
rules r1 and r4, and permit rule r
′
2,3 with condition “(resource.creator == 43 or
resource.type == ‘catalog’) and resource.org != ‘LargeBank’ and resource.org !=
‘eDocs’ ” for a subject which is not a guest, is affiliated with LargeBank and has
identifier 43. The condition of rule r′2,3 is directly translated to a query, mapping
the resource attributes to the corresponding table columns in the process.
5 Complexity analysis
Figure 4 illustrated that the transformation approach iterates two times for a
policy depth of three. In general, the number of iterations over the two flattening
steps of the transformation is d − 1, with d the depth of a policy tree (i.e., the
maximum number of ancestor components of any rule in the policy).
Transformation of a policy tree to an equivalent flat policy may introduce
redundancy with regard to the original conditions extracted from its rules. To an-
alyze this, we again consider the impact of the two flattening steps to determine
how many times an expression is repeated to retain semantic equivalence. We
denote |RP (p)| and |RD(p)| the size of the set of permit and deny rule conditions
of a policy component p, respectively. For the first step, we conclude:
– Transformation from a DO algorithm is possible to a single permit rule with
condition [
∧
rd∈deny(p)
¬cond(rd)] ∧ [
∨
rp∈permit(p)
cond(rp)]. This is equivalent to the combi-
nation of permit rules from ΘDO. At most |RP (p)|+ |RD(p)| expressions are
combined to reflect the permit rule, and hence there is no redundancy.
– Transformation from a FA algorithm is similar. Conditions of the original
deny rules can be interspersed in the conjunction to become a single permit
rule with a condition of at most |RP (p)|+ |RD(p)| compounded expressions.
– A PO algorithm element is not transformed as it satisfies the goal of this
step. The permit rules thus maintain the original |RP (p)| expressions.
As a result, the first flattening step does not by itself introduce any redundancy.
Analyzing redundancy for the second step is not as straightforward, as it
requires reasoning in terms of the depth of the policy tree. To identify the worst-
case scenario, we start by analyzing the case in which each ancestor along the
path of the policy tree contains the same combining algorithm.
– Transformation from a DO algorithm requires that the conditions of permit
rules of child policies are included both in disjunction and in a conjunction
with the negation of conditions of their deny rules. Consequently, each condi-
tion of a permit rule is included twice for each policy component with DO al-
gorithm. This results in a worst-case redundancy of 2d×|RP |+(2d−1)×|RD|.
– Transformation from a FA algorithm can again be based on the interspersion
of the deny rule conditions between the permit rule conditions. Doing so, this
transformation leads to at most |RP (p)|+ |RD(p)| compounded expressions.
– Transformation from a PO algorithm includes only the original rules. Hence,
there is no redundancy here and at most |RP (p)| expressions are included.
This analysis shows that FA and PO algorithms do not introduce redundancy.
However, DO algorithms may lead to significant redundancy. Practical experi-
ence from our case studies (among others, [2]) indicates that the policy depth
typically does not grow large (at most 5 in our case studies), and that this
includes other combining algorithms along the path. More importantly, in a sce-
nario with subsequent DO ancestors in a policy tree, duplicate conditions cancel
each other out, leading to no redundancy in that case. For instance, consider
again the example for the DO algorithm transformation in Section 4.2. Here,
because the child element was transformed from a DO algorithm as well, the
expressions cancel each other out and result in no redundancy. In general, this is
true for both FA and DO algorithms that are transformed under a parent DO.
This leads to a worst-case redundancy of 2bd/2c×|RP |+(2bd/2c−1)×|RD| when
DO and PO algorithm components are interspersed along an ancestor path.
Consequently, normalization may reduce the worst case effects significantly and
further analysis for this is an interesting topic for future work.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have analyzed a transformation approach that supports con-
version of a tree-structured, attribute-based policy language with four-valued
logic (such as XACML) to an expression that can be combined together with
a database search query to enforce access control. We have proven that this
transformation leads to an equivalent evaluation, i.e., that it yields the same
evaluation result as a regular policy evaluation. In future work, we will imple-
ment this and perform a thorough analysis on the performance of this approach.
The transformation only leads to significant redundancy in expressions when
policy components with a deny overrides combining algorithm are involved. How-
ever, inefficient queries can be further reduced by case-specific measures and our
case studies indicate that they would only involve a limited practical overhead.
Nevertheless, we believe that developing measures to optimize this further con-
stitutes an interesting topic for future work. We are convinced that this work is
an important step towards support for policy-based access control for databases.
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